We present a model of labor market equilibrium in which managers are riskaverse, managerial talent ("alpha") is scarce and firms compete for this talent. When there is lack of managerial mobility across firms, firms provide efficient long-term compensation that allows for learning about managerial talent and assigning managers to tasks based on their talent. In this case, firms can insure low-quality managers since high-quality managers have limited outside options. In contrast, the ability of managers to move across firms raises the prospect of high-quality managers extracting full economic rents due their skill and this prevents firms from providing co-insurance among managers. In anticipation, risk-averse managers may churn across firms before their performance is fully learnt and thereby prevent their efficient assignment to tasks. The result is excessive risk-taking with pay for short-term performance and build up of longterm risks. As the model is suited to explaining compensation and turnover in the financial sector, we conclude with analysis of policies to address the externality in compensation among financial firms.
Introduction
Excess risk-taking by financial institutions and overly generous managerial pay are regarded by many as key factors contributing to the 2007-08 subprime lending crisis. 1 In particular, it has become commonplace to blame banks and securities companies for offering compensation packages that reward managers (and more generally, other risk-takers such as traders and salesmen) generously for undertaking investments with high returns in the short run but with large "tail risks" that emerge only in the long run. As governments have been forced to rescue failing financial institutions, politicians and the media have stressed the need that managerial pay packages be cut and incentive pay systems based on options and bonuses be reined in, made more performance-sensitive and long-term, and in some extreme cases, be outright eliminated.
2 As the huge costs of bank rescues have become apparent, political pressure for such executive pay curbs is mounting around the world. It is natural to ask whether these limitations to managerial pay are the right policy response to the problem, or are simply dictated by public anger at the wrongdoings of financial institutions' managers. Indeed, it is crucial to ask what is in fact the problem, that is, which market failure in compensation practices has led to rewards for short-term pay at the expense of a build-up of tail risks.
The argument that we explore in this paper is that the real problem is not the level of managerial pay, but the difficulty of rewarding managerial talent when managers can pick projects with tail risk and the market allows them to move across firms before the risk has materialized. Intuitively, the idea is that in this situation managers have an incentive to take large tail risks in order to raise their short-term performance and pay, while moving rapidly from one firm to another to reduce their effective tenure at any firm and thereby reduce the extent to which they can be held responsible for project failures. With such possibility of managerial churning, firms' competition for managerial talent induces a negative externality, insofar as each firm provides an "escape route" to the managers of others. This is to be contrasted with the case where the market for managerial talent is not very competitive, so that managers are more likely to be stuck with their initial employer.
More specifically, we model managerial talent as "alpha", that is, the ability to generate high returns without incurring high risks: lacking such talent, managers can generate high returns only by taking correspondingly high risks. However, risk emerges only in the long run. So managerial talent can be identified only if managers who have chosen potentially risky projects remain for a sufficiently long period of time with their initial employers: if they leave earlier, the long-term performance of the projects that they have initiated may depend on the way these projects have been managed by their successors, and in general, result in disorderly liquidation or management costs. This is where the competition for managers comes in: if firms compete aggressively, managers can leave before the long-term risks that they have incurred materialize. Since risky projects have a greater expected return (when chosen by a manager of unknown quality) than safe ones, ex ante this induces managers to choose risky rather than safe projects, get a high pay, and then move to another firm where they are going to replicate the same behavior. In the aggregate, managers will be moving continuously from one firm to the next, in each they will choose the risky project irrespective of their ability to avoid (or control) the implied risks, and the talented managers will never be identified.
In contrast, if managers were tied to their initial employer, then over time firms could tell apart the talented from those which are not and insure them against the risk of finding out that they are not talented by cross-subsidizing them at the expense of the talented ones. So there would be two efficiency gains. First, there would be a risk sharing gain. Second, there would be a gain in the allocation of managerial talent: once the better managers are identified, they can be safely assigned to risky projects, while the less talented ones would be constrained to take the safe ones.
Both these gains can arise only if there is less or no managerial churning and induced inefficient risk-taking.
Therefore, competition in the market for managers generates an inefficiency due to the contractual externality among firms. Indeed, the inefficiency is stronger the greater is the probability that a manager who leaves his employer will be hired by another firm. Therefore, the strength of the externality is predicted to correlate with the turnover rate of managers. The empirical prediction is that in markets and countries where there is greater managerial turnover, firms take greater risks, other things being equal. They would also reap greater short-term returns, but at the cost of inefficiently large risks. The financial sector appears to fit these criteria quite well since trader and sales skills are highly fungible across firms. Further, the propensity to take on tail risks is likely intimately tied to the fact that banking revenues and capital are increasingly tied to trading activity relative to interest and fee based activities (Stiroh, 2004) .
Viewed differently, one economic purpose of the firm can be viewed as that of information gathering and learning about its employees' talents and using this in-formation to allocate projects efficiently. The economic purpose of a competitive market for managers is also perceived to be one of producing such efficiency of allocation (see Gabaix and Landier, 2008, among others) . Our model shows that when projects have risks that will materialize only in the long-term, there may be a dark side to the market for managers as it destroys the boundary of the firm that encapsulates its employees, as short-run labor market options interfere with the long-run information gathering and learning functions of the firm. Indeed, this dark side gets exploited by managers as they prefer to take on projects with tail risks and use the labor market to move across firms delaying the resolution of uncertainty about their talent.
We also bring this analysis to bear on the current policy proposals and interventions aimed at introducing long-term features such as clawbacks in compensation or capping the salaries and/or bonuses of top managers (at all or at least some of the leading firms in the sector), primarily in the financial sector. Though none of these policies explicitly addresses the managerial turnover issue, we show that an approppriately chosen salary cap indirectly does, by restoring the employers' ability to cross-subsidizing less talented managers at the expense of more talented ones, and thus allowing some risk sharing even in a regime where the managerial market features no obstacles to mobility. The same outcome would be obtained by "taxing mobility", namely, charging a sufficiently large tax on the income of managers who switch employers as to effectively eliminating ex-post competition for managerial talent (so that the tax would not be paid in equilibrium).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature.
Section 3 lays out the structure of the model. In Section 4 we solve for the equilibrium.
In Section 5 we examine the desirability of various possible policy interventions.
Section 6 concludes.
Related literature
At a broad level, our paper is related to the large literature on executive compensation and corporate governance. Our novelty is to focus on the role of managerial turnover and study its effect on efficiency of risk-taking. Our main result is to show that such turnover enables managers to extract short-term rents from firms.
On the one hand, this is related to the "pay without performance" view of Bebchuk and Fried (2004) . But they attribute the rent extraction to CEO control over the Board of Directors and compensation committees, whereas we attribute it to the presence of a competitive labor market which forces firms to match the outside options of employees.
On the other hand, our result presents a countervailing force to the benefits arising from competitive labor markets through efficient matching. Gabaix and Landier (2008) present matching models à la Rosen (1981) in which the rise in CEO pay is due their scarce talent and its efficient matching to larger firms. Our focus is not so much on the level of pay but on its form. Our model suggests that competition for managers can lead to greater short-term pay.
The fact that managerial turnover introduces an externality across firms in setting their compensation can be considered as a corporate governance externality which has been the focus of several recent papers. Hermalin and Weisbach (2006) recognize that such externalities may be one rationale for regulatory governance standards. Dicks (2009) In contrast to these papers on governance externalities, our focus is on a dynamic setting in which firms require time to learn about their employees and allocate them to proper tasks, but this is compromised due to the ability of managers to generate offers from other firms before their type is fully learnt. Another dynamic setting with some similarity to our effect is that of Axelson and Bond (2009) , who show that smart workers may be "too hard to manage", because their high outside options make them respond less to firing incentives.
Our paper was primarily motivated by evidence of trader churning in the financial sector and the competitive "search for yield" (which we interpret as "seeking alpha") on part of financial firms. None of these papers on the financial crisis has however examined explicitly the role of turnover at managerial or trader level in generating risk-taking incentives.
The introductory quote by Smith (2009) , however, explicitly refers to the role of such turnover in entrenching the culture of bonus without performance on Wall Street.
There are several other accounts in the media that also refer to such a link. In a thought-provoking piece, Tett (2009) compares the Wall Street turnover of traders and salesmen to the poaching of players across football clubs and recognizes that the real issue in addressing compensation in the financial industry is that of addressing the poaching culture of employers and the related high mobility of employees across firms. It is hard to dispute the idea that excessive focus on short-term incentives and individual performance pumped up the recent credit bubble; similarly, it also seems entirely sensible to call for an incentive structure that rewards greater team-work and long-term vision. The $50m question, though, is: how? ... The dirty secret of bank bonuses is that these practices have arisen not merely due to a culture of arrogance; the more pernicious problem is a sense of insecurity. Banks operate in a world where their star talent is apt to jump between different groups, whenever a bigger pay-packet appears, with scant regard for corporate loyalty or employment contracts. The result is that the compensation committees of many banks feel utterly trapped. No wonder that London is now buzzing with rumours that $10m compensation packages are being offered to top fixed income traders and salesmen -including those that have recently received hefty dollops of state aid. Or as one banker says: "These bonuses are crazy -we all know that. But we don't know how to stop paying them without losing our best staff." Against that background, what the members of some compensation committees are quietly starting to conclude is that the only real solution is to start clamping down on the whole "transfer" game. "If Fifa can stop clubs poaching other players and ripping up contracts, then why can't the banks do the same?" asks one... It is time, in other words, for bankers and regulators to take a leaf out of football's book and start debating not just the issue of pay, but also the poaching culture that is at the root of those huge bonus figures.
The Model
There are N profit-maximizing firms, which live forever and are risk neutral, and a continuum of managers, who live for T discrete periods and are risk-averse. Specifically, they maximize the expected utility of final wealth W T :
where the utility function u(W T ) is increasing and concave. The assumption that managers only care about final wealth not only avoids dealing with intertemporal optimization problems (which are not central to the analysis), but more importantly puts no limits on deferring compensation: managers are indifferent whether salaries are paid smoothly over time or are retained in an escrow account until the end of the employment period or even at the time of retirement. In the analysis we note how the results would be affected by removing this assumption.
Managers have no initial wealth (W 0 = 0) and limited liability, so that they their wealth cannot be negative at any point in time:
simplicity, there is no discounting: the interest rate is normalized to zero.
Projects and managers
Managers run one new project per period. Each project lasts for two periods so that each manager manages two projects in steady state. They differ in their management skills: there is a fraction p ∈ (0, 1) of good managers (type G) and a fraction 1 − p of bad ones (type B). Managers themselves initially ignore their own type.
Firms are endowed with a continuum of projects that generate profits with a one-period delay. There are two types of projects that can be assigned to managers:
(i) a safe project S yielding y, irrespective of the quality of the manager in charge of it;
(ii) a risky project R yielding either x or 0, depending on whether it is matched with a good or bad manager.
The dependence of the risky project's payoff on the manager's type can be interpreted as a reflection of his ability in managing the risky project. Good managers add value to risky project by reducing its risk (for simplicity, to zero, namely the same level as that of the safe project), without reducing its expected payoff. In this sense, good managers generate "alpha", in that they improve the risk-return tradeoff of the firm that employs them.
A key assumption is that if a manager initiates a project of type R, his ability becomes known only if he remains in charge of it for both periods. The assumption that the project's first-period performance is uninformative captures the idea that failure is an infrequent event ("tail risk"), so that it takes time to screen a person's ability to manage a risky project. If each period is taken to last several years, the wait to ascertain the quality of a match can be considerable.
By the same token, if a manager leaves after one period, the quality of the match can no longer be gauged. We assume that the completion of the project is entrusted at a cost c to a specialized department within the company, and its outcome becomes totally uninformative about the skills of its initiator. The cost c per project captures the need to pay for the cost of managing the project's completion. It is also a function of manager's and project's specificity; or in other words, it is an inverse measure of the transferability of the project to other managers for completion.
In the hands of this department, the project is pooled together with all other incomplete projects. Denoting by λ the fraction of risky projects initiated by good managers in this pool, the average profit of the pool is λx − c. Thus, if the pool of projects to be completed were initiated by a large random sample of managers, then λ = p (by using the law of large numbers). If instead the pool were entirely made of projects started by bad managers, then λ = 0. Crucially, the profit λx − c is independent of the ability of the individual initial manager, as it reflects the skills of the average manager who left before completing their projects. Therefore, this profit conveys no information about the quality of the manager who initiated the project.
We assume that:
The left-hand side inequality indicates that the expected payoff of project R exceeds that of project S if the manager is of unknown quality: this captures the idea that accepting a greater risk entails a higher expected return. The right-hand side inequality indicates that the expected payoff of project S exceeds that of project R if the manager is known to be bad. The implication of assumption (2) is that the optimal allocation of managers is to assign bad managers only to project S, and good managers only to project R. Assigning bad managers to project R would imply excessive risk-taking.
Market for managerial talent
Each firm has at least one safe and one risky project per manager. Therefore, managers -not projects -are the scarce factor of production, since only they can start a new project. Companies can precommit to long-term wage contracts. Compensation can be contingent on (i) the manager's decision to stay or resign; (ii) the observed payoff of the project initiated in the previous period (if the manager stays). As we will see, this precommitment prevents firms from exploiting any informational advantage that they may gain over their competitors by gauging their employees' ability:
we will remove this assumption in Section ??.
We assume that firms initially bid competitively for managers, anticipating their future performance: this ensures that managers extract entirely the expected profits that they will generate over the course of their tenure. While ex ante there is perfect competition for managerial talent, ex post switching costs may prevent it: over time, managers may make location-or firm-specific investments or develop location-or firm-specific tastes, so that it becomes difficult or impossible for other firms to poach them. To bring out the implications of ex-post competition for managerial talent, we will focus on the two polar cases where switching costs are either prohibitively high -the "non-competitive regime" -or totally absent -the "competitive regime".
The difference between these two regimes may be seen as capturing the changing relationship between bank managers and their employers: in the past, banking used to entail much local knowledge, so that over their careers bank managers developed employer-and location-specific skills; currently, banking is less local, due to technological change and new financial products. At the same time, company loyalty has probably lost considerable appeal in the world of finance.
In the non-competitive regime, even if the on-the-job performance of a manager who chose the risky project generates information about his type, this information remains confined within the boundaries of the firm, so that the manager's compensation will not be recontracted to reflect it. In contrast, if the market for managerial talent is competitive, a manager's outside options will reflect his performance, provided he stays in charge of a risky project for two periods. Howeber, if the manager switches employer and abandons the project before its second-period payoff materializes, his quality remains unknown, so that even in the competitive case his outside options will not be type-dependent. If indeed he switches employer in every period, his type is never known. So mobility between employers, by preventing the production of information about the manager's quality, also prevents conditioning managerial pay on it -even in the competitive case.
We also make a tie-breaking assumption in the competitive regime: a manager prefer to stay with his current employer if the outside employer's offer is not strictly better than his current compensation. This assumption can be motivated with the presence of a tiny switching cost even in the competitive case.
Time Line
A representative manager lives for T periods, from 1 to T , each comprised between two adjacent dates, from t = 0 to t = T :
(i) In period 1, the manager is hired by a firm that pledges to pay him a final compensation W T , possibly conditional on the manager's type (if it ever becomes known) and on his decision to stay or leave the firm in any given period; then the manager is assigned to project S or R. At the end of the period the manager decides whether to switch to a new firm or not in period 2.
(ii) In period 2, the manager decides whether to stay with the previous employer or switch to a new one. If he stays, the manager is assigned to a new project S or R. At the end of the period, the project assigned in period 1 pays off. If the manager was assigned to project S, his type remains unknown. If instead he was assigned to project R, the second-period payoff of the initial project reveals his type.
If instead the manager switches to a new firm, he will receive from his new employer a newly agreed compensation W 0 t , will start a new project in the new firm, and his type remains unknown.
(iii) In any subsequent period from 3 to T − 2, the sequence of moves is the same as under (ii) with appropriate change of time indices.
(iv) In the penultimate period T − 1, the manager is assigned to the final project of his career (either project S or R), which he completes in period T .
Therefore, over the course of his career a manager carries out T − 1 projects.
Equilibrium
In this section we start by considering the equilibrium choices of managers in the two alternative settings: the non-competitive and competitive regime, respectively.
If there is no ex-post competition, good managers cannot be poached by outside employers even if their talent has been revealed by their performance with the current employer. As in this regime good managers cannot switch to a new employer, their equilibrium wage will not reflect their type. When the market for managers is competitive, instead, managers who have been revealed to be good may have an incentive to switch to a new employer, and their equilibrium wage will exceed that offered to bad managers. But in this regime there are also situations in which managers have the incentive to leave the company immediately after undertaking a risky project, so that their type will not be learnt. In this case, their equilibrium wage will obviously not reflect their ability.
Non-competitive regime
In this section we show that if the market for managers is non-competitive, the equilibrium outcome coincides with the first best. The first-best outcome features two characteristics: (i) productive efficiency, that is, optimal allocation of managers to projects, and (ii) optimal risk sharing, that is, complete insurance of managers by firms (as the latter are risk neutral).
To ensure productive efficiency, the type of managers must be learnt as early as possible in their employment history, so as to assign bad managers to type-S projects and good ones to type-R projects for every period thereafter. By assumption 2, this assignment rule yields the maximum life-time expected profit per manager, which as of period 1 is:
The first term is the expected period-1 profits from the type-R project undertaken at t = 0 by a manager of unknown quality; the second term is the payoff from a second type-R project project undertaken at t = 1 (at that stage, the manager is still of unknown type: hence this assignment rule yields the highest profit by assumption 2); while the third term is the sum of the expected continuation payoffs of the two groups of managers in periods 3 to T , weighted by their respective frequencies.
To guarantee optimal risk sharing, managers must be paid a fixed compensation,
i.e. a salary that is not contingent on their quality. Since under our assumption of ex-ante competition among firms managers extract the entire social surplus, on a per-period basis their compensation must equal the average future profit that they will generate:
which entails expected utility
for managers, and zero profits for firms. Notice that w * ∈ (y, x), that is the first-best per-period salary is an intermediate value between the profit generated by the safe project and the highest profit generated by a risky project. By assumption, in this regime this salary cannot be outbid by outside employers even for managers who have been recognized to be good.
Consider now the task assignment policy by the firm. Since the manager will not switch to a new employer, the optimal policy is clearly to assign him to a risky project in periods 1 and 2 of his career and for the subsequent T − 3 periods to risky projects if good and to safe ones if bad. This policy ensures that in expectation the manager will generate profits (3) over his career, thereby allowing the firm to break even. Any other policy would generate expected losses for the firm.
This argument proves the following result:
Proposition 1 Without ex-post competition for managers, the first-best outcome is attained in equilibrium.
Note that optimal risk sharing requires the firm not to condition the salary on the quality of the employees, even though it uses this information in allocating them to different types of projects. This implies that good managers will subsidize bad ones, but switching costs prevent them from leaving the company to avoid paying this subsidy.
Competitive market for managers
When there is ex-post competition for managerial talent, the first-best allocation characterized above may no longer be an equilibrium. To see this, note that competition changes the outside options for managers who chose the risky project and remained at least two periods with an employer: since outside employers can now infer the manager's ability, they will bid his wage up to x for good managers, and will offer y to bad ones. Since the first-best salary w * in (4) is smaller than x and greater than y, good managers will leave, while the bad ones will stay. Hence, the salary w * would entail losses for the initial employer, and the cross-subsidization required to provide optimal risk sharing becomes unfeasible.
Notice, however, that the initial employer can offer a contract that is more effective in deterring good managers from leaving. The most effective such contract (consistent with zero expected profits) is one that makes the entire date-T compensation Π * contingent on the manager never leaving the firm. In other words, the firm will pay nothing if the manager leaves at any time in his career. 4 Consider a manager who has been revealed to be good in period 2. If he were to stay with the initial employer, his final wealth would be Π * . If instead he were to leave at the end of period 2, he would earn a final wealth (T − 3)x from the new employer, given that there is perfect competition. The comparison between (T − 3)x and Π * yields a cutoff value b T , which defines the maximum time horizon that allows the firm to retain its managers through the contract just described:
If T ≤ b T the first-best allocation can be sustained even in the competitive regime, while if T > b T it cannot. Intuitively, if the manager's employment horizon T is very short, then he must spend a large fraction of his career with an employer just to be recognized as being of good quality: in the extreme, if his career where to span 3 periods (T = 3), he would spend 2/3 of it proving his quality to the initial employer and only 1/3 with a new one; since b T > 3, the new employer would not be able to offer him a sufficiently attractive deal. Hence, the first best would be feasible. If instead T > b T , the contract that defers all compensation Π * to the final date T , and pays nothing if the manager leaves at any time before that would not deter the manager from leaving. Then, the first best would not be feasible.
It is instructive to see how this cutoff value responds to changes in the other two main parameters of the problem. In Panel A of Figure 1 , we show that an increase in the fraction of good managers, p, expands the range of values of T for which the first-best allocation can be achieved (for instance, for p very close to 1 it can be achieved even for very large T ): intuitively, the cost of subsidizing bad managers is quite low because there are few of them. In Panel B, instead, we see that an increase in the excess profitability of a well-managed risky project over that of a safe one, x − y, reduces the range of values of T for which the first-best allocation can be achieved:
when these excess profits are large, outside employers can lure away a good manager even if his remaining job tenure is relatively short.
The previous argument has focused on a manager who switches employer at the end of period 2. But a manager who does not want to switch to a new employer at that point in time will not want to deviate later, since the profits from quitting would be even lower. Moreover, no manager will want to switch employer at the end of period 1, since at that time he would still be of unknown quality for an outside employer: therefore, switching would not yield a better offer from another employer, and may be penalized by his initial employer paying him zero.
The following proposition summarizes the results so far:
Proposition 2 With a competitive managerial market, the first best can be attained in equilibrium if and only if T ≤ b T , where b T is defined by expression (6), if there are no restrictions to withholding compensation to resigning managers.
In practice, however, legal restrictions assumed away in the previous argument may exist: it may be illegal to write an employment contract where the manager is denied any compensation for past employment just because he chooses to switch to a new employer. This is also because in practice at least a portion of the total compensation is paid in the form of salary, to fund intermediate consumption (possibly because otherwise managers would be unable to achieve the desired consumption smoothing due to borrowing constraints). In conjunction with limited liability, such salary payments could not be reclaimed by the initial employer, and therefore they reduce the parameter region where the first best can be attained, compared to the region described in Proposition 2. Intuitively, the more the firm is constrained in deferring compensation, the lower is the penalty that it can threaten to inflict on resigning managers, and therefore the smaller is the parameter region for which it can attain the same employees' loyalty as in the opaque market -and thus offer the implied risk sharing to them. This point is formally stated in the following:
Corollary 3 If part of the total compensation is paid as non-recoverable per-period salary w > 0, the maximum time horizon for which the first best can be attained is:
which is strictly decreasing in w.
What happens when the first best cannot be attained, that is, when T > b T ? To answer this question, we need to consider the subgame perfect equilibrium of the model. In each period t the manager chooses whether to stay or to leave, while the firm chooses whether to assign him to the safe or the risky project. Every time a manager is hired, perfect competition among firms implies that he is offered the contract that maximizes his continuation utility, conditional on the information on the manager's quality available at that stage. The contract specifies the final wealth of the manager, conditional on whether the manager stays or leaves, and conditional on his type (if known). Given that the market for managers is perfectly competitive, the contract that maximizes the manager's continuation utility is also the manager's utility if he chooses to leave (in other words, his outside option).
We will show in the proof of Proposition 3 that there are three candidate equilibrium outcomes:
• Outcome A (no insurance for managers but optimal risk taking by firms): "the manager is assigned to project R for the first 2 periods of employment; and for every period from 3 to T − 1 he is assigned to project R if he turns out to be good or to project S if he turns out to be bad. His final compensation is 2px + (T − 3)x if he turns out to be good, and 2px + (T − 3)y if he turns out to be bad."
• Outcome B (insurance "by churning" for managers but excessive risk taking by firms): "the manager is assigned to project R and changes employer in every period for the first K B periods. Afterwards, he stays with the employer and is assigned to project R in period K B +1, and from period K B +2 onwards to project R if he turns out to be good and project S if he turns out to be bad, for a K B to be determined. His total final compensation is u ((T − 1)px − (T − 2)c)."
• Outcome C (insurance "by staying" for managers but too little risk taking by firms): "the manager is assigned to project S for the first K C periods, to project R in period K C + 1 and K C + 2, and after from period K C + 3 to project R if he turns out to be good and project S if he turns out to be bad. The final
Consider first outcome A. The contract satisfies with equality the retention constraint (RC), which states that a manager who has been revealed to be good cannot be retained by his initial employer unless he receives per-period compensation x for the rest of his career. Hence, there is no possibility of insurance, but the allocation of managers across projects is efficient. The associated expected utility is:
For this outcome to be an equilibrium one needs to check that (i) the manager has no incentive to leave the firm after period 1, after being assigned to project R but before learning his own type; and (ii) the firm has no incentive to assign him to project S instead of project R in period 1. These are the two only possible deviations:
there is no reason for the manager to deviate after his type is known, as the retention constraint is satisfied.
Consider outcome B next. In such case, all managers are assigned to type-R projects but stay in a firm only for one period, leaving before they can learn their type. This happens for K B periods, so that their type is not learnt. After K B periods, the firm assigns them to project R for one period and then allocates them efficiently, because the managers do not leave their employer after K B periods. Because their type is not learnt until period K B , their compensation will not be typecontingent. Competition ensures that their lifetime compensation is the expected profit px − c that they generate in each period from 1 to K B , plus px in the remaining T − K B − 1 periods, where K B is such that the expected utility from staying and being allocated to the efficient projects (after one more period of risky project),
, equals the expected utility from moving to another employer, u ((T − K B − 2) (px − c) + px). Notice that the manager cannot be offered any insurance after his type is revealed because he has been churning from one firm to another. Hence, the last employer has no power to punish the manager for leaving using his accumulated compensation. The associated expected utility is:
For this outcome to be an equilibrium, it must be checked that (i) the manager has no incentive to deviate at time 1 by staying in the initial firm; and (ii) the firm has no incentive to choose project S instead than project R at time 0.
Finally, consider outcome C. In this case, managers are assigned to project S for K periods, so that their type is not learnt. After K periods, the firm assigns them to project R for two periods and then allocates them efficiently. The expected utility associated with this outcome is:
The right-hand side equality is obtained by finding the K that ensures that the good manager has no incentive to deviate. Specifically, after K + 2 periods, the manager learns his type and may want to leave (if he is good) to obtain the higher wage x forever after. The firm can punish the manager by paying him nothing.
If we call Z the final wealth with no deviation, the retention constraint implies
The zero-profit condition for firms implies that Z =
Combining this condition with the retention constraint (taken with equality) yields the value of K that ensures no deviation by the manager:
For this outcome to be an equilibrium, it must only be checked that the firm has no incentive to choose project R instead than project S at time 0, since by construction the manager has no incentive to deviate.
Proposition 4 Under the assumption of perfect competition among firms, the equilibrium outcome is the one that maximizes the manager's utilities given by equations (8), (9) and (10).
Proof: Since all firms are identical and there is perfect competition both ex ante and ex post, we can show that there are only two types of equilibria: those in which the manager never leaves the first employer and those in which he leaves every period.
Indeed, suppose that the manager leaves after the first period and works for another employer for 2 (or more) periods. Then, the first employer should also be able to retain the manager for at least 2 periods.
First, if in period 2 the manager is found to be good, after period 2 he will be assigned to the risky project and will be paid x. If W G S is the payoff from staying and W G L (as specified by the employment contract) is the payoff for leaving, a good manager stays if the retention constraint (RC) is satisfied, namely if
In this constraint, W G L can be set at its minimum value: W G L = 0. As the payoff from leaving is strictly decreasing in t, if the constraint is satisfied for t = 2, it is always satisfied. Hence, W G S = (T − 3) x. If the manager is known to be bad, he will be assigned to the safe project. However, he will not leave as long as
Again the employer will set W B L = 0. However, the initial employer cannot pay more than W B S = (T − 3) y, otherwise he would make losses. Therefore, the manager is assigned to project R for the first 2 periods of employment; and for every period from 3 to T − 1 he is assigned to project R if he turns out to be good or to project S if he turns out to be bad. His final compensation is 2px + (T − 3)x if he turns out to be good, and 2px + (T − 3)y if he turns out to be bad. The associated utility is pu (2px + (T − 3)x) + (1 − p)u (2px + (T − 3)y). This is outcome A in the text.
Second, we need to consider the case in which the manager leaves every period.
In such case, the manager is assigned to the risky project and leaves before he finds out his type. Hence, there is no production efficiency and no learning. This happens for K B periods. After K B periods, the firm assigns them to project R for one period and then allocates them efficiently, because the managers do not leave their employer after K B periods. K B is such that the expected utility from staying and being allocated to the efficient projects (after one more period of risky project),
, equals the expected utility from moving to another employer, u ((T − K B − 2) (px − c) + px). Given this, the total final compensation is independent of the manager's type:
This corresponds to outcome B in the text.
In the third and final case, the manager is assigned to the safe project at the beginning and for the first K periods and then he is assigned to the risky project, provided that K < T −1. The K must be found in such a way that the good manager has no incentive to deviate. Specifically, after K + 2 periods, the manager learns his type and may want to leave (if he is good) to obtain the higher wage x forever after.
This does not happen if
where W G L can be set to 0 and the RC constraint can be met with equality (W
. Given the zero-profit condition for firms,
, we can combine the two equations to find:
The associated utility is u (Ky + 2px
. This is outcome C in the text.
Given perfect ex-ante competition among firms, the subgame perfect equilibrium is the one that is associated with the highest utility for the manager.¥
We cannot characterize the set of equilibria in general, given the generic functional form u(·): but we do provide a numerical example in the next section. Before doing so, we can characterize when outcome B, which we believe is the most interesting, is the equilibrium outcome:
Proposition 5 With a competitive managerial market, if T > b T , the equilibrium features insurance for managers, continuous labor mobility and excessive risk taking, if the cost c of running the risky project is smaller than a threshold c defined below.
Proof: Let C A be the certainty equivalent of the utility associated with outcome A,
. We can then find the value of the cost c that equates the utility associated with outcomes A and
and the value of c that equates the utility associated with outcome B and outcome C:
Outcome B is the only equilibrium iff c ≤ min{b c, b b c} ≡ c.¥
Numerical example
In this section, we present a numerical example with power utility to show how the solution varies across parameter values. In what follows, we assume power utility with relative risk aversion γ, that is, u(w) = w 1−γ . In the four panels of Figure 2, we plot the equilibrium in the parameter space (c, γ) for different values of x and T .
We normalize the output of the safe project by assuming that y = 1 and assume that the fraction of good managers is fixed at p = 0.3. We consider four different values for x and T .
Panel A is the basic scenario, where x = 8 and T = 10. As can be seen, outcome A (which correspond to full productive efficiency) is the equilibrium outcome only
for low values of risk aversion γ. For sufficiently high risk aversion, outcome A is dominated by either outcome B or C, which provide insurance against risk. The choice between the latter two depends on the cost c of transferring the completion of the project to other managers. If projects are not very specific (c < 0.17), the optimal form of insurance is provided by the equilibrium B; otherwise, outcome C is the subgame perfect equilibrium.
In Panel B, we increase the time horizon of the manager by 50 percent. The effect of this change is that outcome C becomes relatively worse compared to outcomes A and B (in the figure, the set of value of (c, γ) for which C is the equilibrium shrinks to the advantage of areas A and B). This change is due to the fact that increasing the time horizon increases, in the context of equilibrium C, the number of years during which the manager is assigned to the safe project before it can be switched to the risky project. Because the expected value of the risky project is 2.4 times more valuable than the safe project (0.3 · 8 compared to 1), outcome C becomes significantly worse (compared to outcomes A and B) than in the basic case.
A similar effect is obtained in Panel C, where we increase the expected profitability of the risky project (px) from 2.4 to 3. As in Panel B, the effect of this change is that the set of value of (c, γ) for which C is the equilibrium shrinks to the advantage of areas A and B. This change is due to the fact that in equilibrium C the manager is assigned to the safe project for K periods, where K is given in equation (11) 
Policy Interventions
The model presented in the previous sections highlights that, by allowing competition for managerial talent, transparency can induce inefficiencies in two ways: first, it limits risk-sharing opportunities that firms can offer to managers; second, if the parameters are such that churning across employers occurs in equilibrium, it induces excess risk taking and therefore a loss of production efficiency. In this section we consider which policy interventions can limit or eliminate these inefficiencies.
Clawbacks and Long-Term Indexing
Several recent proposals to reform managerial compensation in financial institutions are based on the idea that it would be desirable to defer ("claw back") a part of the managerial compensation and index this deferred compensation to long-term managerial performance. The idea behind such proposals is precisely to address the excess risk-taking that arises in our "churning equilibrium", namely, discourage managers from taking projects that are likely to be highly profitable in the short run but feature "tail risk".
However, in our setting deferring compensation would be inconsequential. The model already place no constraints on deferral of managerial compensation: indeed, in the above analysis compensation is already assumed to be paid at the end of the manager's career. Even in the churning equilibrium, it is inessential whether in each period the employer pays the manager's compensation for that period or defers it to some future date: the essential point is that the compensation cannot be made contingent on the manager's type. In such an equilibrium, long-term indexing would be ineffective, because the past performance of the manager is uninformative about his type (his "true alpha").
It is true instead that anything that constrains the firms' ability to defer compensation is inefficient. As shown by Corollary 1, if for some exogenous reason firms cannot defer compensation entirely and make its payment contingent on the employees' loyalty, the parameter region where the first-best outcome obtains becomes smaller. It can also be shown that this would also tighten the retention constraint in regime C (where firms offer some risk sharing at the cost of lower productive efficiency), and therefore expand the parameter regions where this regime is dominated by regime A (no risk sharing but productive efficiency) or by the churning regime B. Therefore, constraining compensation deferral can make churning more attractive. However, even if no such constraints exist (as is the case in our model), the equilibrium can be inefficient, as shown in the previous sections.
Salary caps
Another very frequently mentioned policy proposal is to impose a cap on managerial compensation. How would such a policy actually change the ranking between the three regimes considered in Section 4? Specifically, would it make churning -and the associated excess risk taking -less attractive to managers?
Suppose that policy-makers were to introduce a salary cap at w * on the per-period compensation of managers. Such a cap would prevent employers from poaching high-quality managers from each other in the competitive regime, and makes the perfect risk-sharing and no-churning outcome sustainable in equilibrium. To see this, comsider the equilibrium candidate where each employer offers the wage w * to all his managers, and assigns them optimally once their type becomes known. Then, due to the salary cap, a competing employer could not poach the managers who have proved to be good from their current employer. Moreover, churning in every period would not be an equilibrium: in that case, on a per-period basis he would earn px − (T − 2)c/(T − 1) < w * , so that he would deviate to an employer who offered him w * . By the same argumemt, it is immediate that any per-period salary below w * would not be consistent with equilibrium.
So a binding price cap would guarantee efficient risk sharing between employees by shutting down competition for good managers. It would also simultaneously ensure the avoidance of excess risk taking by firms, since it would discourage managers from churning across firms to avoid revealing their true ability.
An effect similar to that of a salary cap could be achieved by a tax on managerial mobility: suppose that the compensation of a manager who switches to a new employer were taxed at a higher rate than that of a loyal manager. If the tax is set at a sufficiently high rate, it would effectively move the economy to the first best even if the managerial labor market is competitive, as it would effectively block ex-post competition for managerial talent. Note that such a tax would never be paid in equilibrium, since managers would not switch to other employers. Therefore, the policy prescription arising from the model is to "throw sand in the wheels of the managerial market".
Both a salary cap and this equivalent tax on managerial mobility would redistribute income from good to bad managers. In the current setting this has no implications for efficiency, but it would have a negative effect on efficiency in a richer setting in which ex ante managers can invest in their quality at a private cost -for instance, by taking an MBA they can raise their probability p of being a good manager. In this case, capping their salary -and therefore their lifetime compensation -would reduce the "average alpha" of managers.
Moreover, in the real world preventing reallocation of managerial talent may have efficiency costs that are not captured by the present model: if managers and firms are heterogeneous, they may both learn gradually about the quality of their match, so that it may be efficient for bad matches to be dissolved and new ones be undertaken.
Also, limiting or preventing managerial mobility may confer market power to firms, and thereby create holdup problems. In our setting, this would be inconsequential because of ex-ante competition, but in reality this assumption may not hold either.
Conclusions
In this paper we show that the market for managers has a dark side, in that it allows them to take on projects with short-term rewards and pay at the cost of exposing firms to long-run or tail risks, since they can move across firms before these risks are realized. If the market for managers is effectively shut (for example, due to firm-specificity of managerial investments), then the outcome is improved in that it features less inefficient risk-taking. This is associated with two benefits: (i) firms can learn about their managers' types over time and use this information to achieve production gains, because employees do not leave; and, (ii) firms can offer insurance gains to their employees, because the better employees can be used to subsidize the worse ones, and thereby all employees can be insured against the risk arising from the value of their own human capital. We do not intend to suggest that there is no economic value to the market for managers and employees, but highlight the counterintuitive possibility that it in fact fundamentally interferes with firms' ability to generate information about employees.
Besides its theoretical contribution that is especially suitable for understanding risk-taking in the financial sector, our line of research also suggests an empirical one.
The immediate testable prediction of our model is that there should be a positive correlation over time between the mobility of senior managers and traders across financial institutions and their risk taking. If we allow for cross-sectional differences across managers so that some managers are more prone to take risk than others, then our analysis implies a second testable prediction: the larger risks taken by financial institutions should be systematically related to the subset of managers that are more likely to move across financial institutions. In other words, the hypothesis is that there is a group of highly rewarded managers who specialize in taking tail risks and move rapidly across employers. Indeed, recent empirical work by Deuskar, Pollet, Wang and Zheng (2009) suggests that the turnover of managers from mutual fund industry to hedge-fund industry may also be potentially a useful setting to test the implications of our theory. In particular, and consistent with the modelŠs predictions, they find that best-performing mutual fund managers stay in-house and do hedgefund style investments, whereas it is the average performers who switch to the out-ofhouse hedge funds. Their results are consistent with average performers "restarting their clocksŤ and allowing themselves a new round of risky investments, and at the same time, better performers extracting rents from their firms upon discovery of their type. We plan to pursue empirically the full set of testable implications of our model in future research. 
